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Abstract
Scholars around the world are beginning to focus on the role of the legal system in 
preparing for such events and responding to them after they occur. This article offers an 
introduction to the field of disaster law with a particular focus on the United States and 
Brazil. The article begins with an overview of disaster law and explains some unifying 
themes. These themes connect risk mitigation, emergency response, compensation, and 
rebuilding after disasters. The remainder of the article focuses on one crucial insight: 
harm from disasters is almost always caused or at least worsened by failure to regulate 
risks in advance using land use law or environmental law. Disaster law will become even 
more important in the future due to climate change and other developments, such as 
population growth and expanded populations living near coasts and estuaries.
Key words: Natural disasters, nuclear power, pollution, oil spills, climate change, risk 
management.
Resumo
Estudiosos de todo o mundo estão começando a focar no papel do jurídico na preparação 
para esses eventos e na reação a eles depois de sua ocorrência. Este artigo oferece uma 
introdução ao campo do Direito dos desastres com um foco particular nos Estados Unidos 
e no Brasil. O artigo começa com uma visão geral do Direito dos desastres e explica alguns 
temas unificadores. Estes temas conectam a mitigação de riscos, a resposta de emergência, 
a indenização e a reconstrução após catástrofes. O restante do artigo foca uma percepção 
crucial: o dano das catástrofes é quase sempre causado ou no mínimo agravado por falta de 
regulação antecipada de riscos pelo direito fundiário e pelo direito ambiental. O Direito dos 
desastres tornar-se-á ainda mais importante no futuro devido à mudança climática e outros 
desdobramentos, como o crescimento populacional e o aumento das populações vivendo 
próximas a costas e estuários.
Palavras-chave: catástrofes naturais, energia nuclear, poluição, derramamentos de 
óleo, mudança climática, gestão de riscos.
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2 Although this article focuses on the legal literature, disasters are also the subject of a robust and growing body of work in economics and policy analysis. See, e.g., 
Kunreuther and Useem (2009).
Introduction
  
The last few decades have been punctuated by 
natural disasters and manmade accidents. The disas-
ters include severe tsunamis, cyclones and hurricanes, 
while notable accidents include nuclear meltdowns and 
massive oil spills. Legal scholars around the world are 
beginning to focus on the role of the legal system in 
preparing for such events and responding to them after 
they occur. This article offers an overview of the field of 
disaster law with a particular focus on the United States 
and Brazil.
Traditionally, Brazil has not been heavily exposed 
to natural disasters, but insurance companies say that 
this situation is changing:
Natural disasters will likely become more frequent in 
Brazil and also more costly in terms of human lives 
and government expenditures, said Fabio Corrias, 
Swiss Re’s head of corporate solutions for Brazil and 
the rest of the Southern Cone.
Brazil has traditionally had a very low exposure to 
natural disasters, but during the last five years the 
frequency of events such as heavy rains, floods and 
avalanches has increased, Corrias told a conference in 
Sao Paulo hosted by the Swiss reinsurer.
The latest such events occurred in January this year 
in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, when 
floods killed more than 800 people and left some 
6,000 homeless.
Corrias noted that due to lack of insurance and rein-
surance, this event cost the public sector US$460mn 
in emergency spending.
The area most exposed to natural disasters in Brazil is 
the south east due to high population density, Corrias 
said (Rindebro, 2011).
The Brazilian legal system is still adapting to 
these new issues arising from disasters.
One of those issues is risk mitigation. For in-
stance, lack of preparation may have contributed to 
hundreds of deaths from landslides:
The hillside areas around Rio lacked early warning 
systems or effective community organizations that 
might have helped residents to wake one another as 
the rains intensified last Tuesday night, disaster ex-
perts and residents said. Most people are believed 
to have died early Wednesday morning as they slept, 
when water-loosened earth swept their houses 
away (Kahn, 2011).
Illustrating the connection between disaster risks 
and inadequate regulation, weak control of urban settle-
ment was also a contributing factor in the Rio landslides:
Rio de Janeiro State officials have cited irregular oc-
cupation of areas at risk of floods and landslides as 
the main reason that so many have been dying. Carlos 
Minc, Rio’s environment secretary, said Thursday that 
the state’s civil defense authority urgently needed to 
relocate residents in high-risk areas (Kahn, 2011, quot-
ing Brazilian sources).
This article attempts to provide a framework for 
thinking about these emerging issues in Brazil, without 
being so presumptuous as to suggest the correct solu-
tions for the Brazilian legal system. It is tempting to think 
that disasters are either natural events completely out-
side of human control or are unavoidable accidents. But 
human beings can plan ahead to reduce the probability of 
many disasters and reduce their harm, as well as estab-
lishing procedures for rebuilding afterwards. Legal schol-
ars in the United States and elsewhere are beginning to 
focus on disaster law as a field of study. Hopefully, some of 
the lessons may be useful in the Brazilian context.
Disasters strike unpredictably enough that we 
are somehow always surprised and never quite pre-
pared. The risks are also diverse and the harms are dis-
tinctive: an earthquake is not a hurricane, and a hur-
ricane  is not an oil spill. But there is a deep underlying 
predictability to disasters. Nothing is more predictable 
than the fact that some day again a major hurricane will 
hit a U.S. or Caribbean city; that heat waves will hit cit-
ies; or that poorly regulated but dangerous industries 
will have devastating accidents. It is also predictable 
that, if we do not address climate change, coastal cities 
around the world will be at greater risk and heat waves 
will be more devastating. It is heartening that the legal 
academy is beginning to pay attention to these risks in a 
serious way, but much more needs to be done.2 
Part I of this article provides an overview of 
disaster law and explains some unifying themes. These 
themes connect risk mitigation, emergency response, 
compensation, and rebuilding after disasters. The re-
mainder of the article focuses on one crucial insight: 
harm from disasters is almost always caused or at least 
worsened by failure to regulate risks in advance using 
land use law or environmental law. These regulatory fail-
ures set the stage for widespread harm but often are 
not appreciated in advance of the event. 
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Part II illustrates this point with examples from 
around the world, including Brazil. Examples include 
floods and landslides, nuclear reactor meltdowns, oil 
spills, and heat waves. In each case, lack of adequate con-
trol of risks—a failure of the regulatory state—contrib-
uted to the tragic outcome. 
Part III then focuses on a particular regulatory 
failure: the failure of the international community to 
control climate change. This failure will increase many 
kinds of disaster risks, whether in developed countries 
like the United States, or developing countries such as 
Brazil. Disaster law will become even more important 
in the future due to climate change and other develop-
ments, such as population growth and expanded popula-
tions living near coasts and estuaries.
Disasters and the Legal System
Hurricane Katrina sparked interest by U.S. legal 
scholars in disaster law. More than any other disaster in 
American history, Hurricane Katrina brought into sharp 
relief the limitations in the law’s capacity to anticipate 
and respond to catastrophic events. With problems 
ranging from the amplification of already-entrenched 
social injustices and the exhaustion and failure of com-
pensation systems, to the paralysis on the ground result-
ing from ambiguous divisions of disaster management 
responsibilities among state and federal governments, 
Katrina and its aftermath made manifest the American 
legal regime’s inability to handle disaster risks effectively 
(see American Bar Association, 2007). 
The legal system plays a central role in disas-
ter prevention, response, and management.3 For disas-
ter experts, Hurricane Katrina was merely a further 
confirmation that the law is woefully unprepared to 
handle disasters. A growing community of researchers 
recognizes this problem and is formulating solutions 
under the rubric of disaster law. This emerging legal 
academic field encompasses a wide-ranging, interdis-
ciplinary body of research seeking to inform and im-
prove disaster-related decision-making, as evidenced 
by recent books4 and a rapidly expanding number of 
law review articles.5 
The emergence of disaster law in the U.S. may 
be compared to the birth of environmental law in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, when a small group of prac-
titioners and professors recognized the dire need for 
a coordinated legal approach to a sprawling and life-
threatening problem (Lazarus, 2004, p. 47). Their efforts 
created a new field of legal studies;6 the task and the 
potential of disaster law are no less critical in the cur-
rent tumultuous era.
Before plunging into a study of disaster law, how-
ever, we need to first identify the distinctive traits of 
natural and manmade disasters. Section A addresses the 
definitional issue. With this clearer definition of the sub-
ject matter, Section B then sets forth a framework for 
understanding the legal and policy issues about disas-
ters, the “circle of disaster management.”
What is a “Disaster”?
The common conception of disaster focuses on 
events that are sudden, significant, and natural. But “di-
saster” is in practice a malleable term.7 The suddenness 
criterion emphasizes the emergency period, but an im-
portant consideration in defining the field is whether 
prevention and development of resilience before the 
event, and compensation and rebuilding after the event, 
are to be included. With respect to naturalness, it has 
been argued that there is actually “no such thing as a 
natural disaster.”8 The second factor, significance, is to 
some extent in the eye of the beholder. The third factor, 
naturalness, turns out to be somewhat misleading. Physi-
cal “phenomena are a necessary component of risk, but 
they are only the starting point in addressing safety 
concerns”—to be fully effective, the work of calculating 
and planning for disaster risk must account for “acts of 
nature, [...] weaknesses of human nature, and [...] side 
effects of technology” (Farber et al., 2010, p. 3; 2006,
p. 1085, 1090). In this Article, we will also consider tech-
nological disasters – accidents that affect ecosystems or 
3 These issues are the subject of Farber et al. (2010).
4 Farber et al. (2010); Nolon and Rodriguez (2007); Verchick (2010); Hunter (2008).
5  We can get some sense of the expansion from a Westlaw search (“flood insurance”, “levees”, “oil spill”, “forest fire”, “natural disaster”). For 2000-2005, the search 
produced 23 documents; for 2006-2011, the search produced 105 documents (search of JLR database on July 17, 2011). A search for “Hurricane Katrina” in the same 
database on January 28, 2011 produced 3302 documents, of which 125 had the term in their titles.
6 The conference resulted in the formation of the Environmental Law Institute (Lazarus, 2004, p. 48).
7  Dauber (1998, p. 967, 971). “Although the category ‘disaster’ at first may seem unproblematic, I suggest that we should see its definition and boundaries as precisely 
what is at stake in many contests over the allocation of federal resources.”
8  Smith (2006). “It is generally accepted among environmental geographers that there is no such thing as a natural disaster. In every phase and aspect of a disaster—
causes, vulnerability, preparedness, results and response, and reconstruction—the contours of disaster and the difference between who lives and who dies is to a 
greater or lesser extent a social calculus.”
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large populations. There are also hybrids, where natural 
events cause technological accidents, which in turn in-
tensify damage from the disaster.
The issue of “suddenness” deserves special atten-
tion. Air pollution provides an example of how analysis 
of risk can be distorted by focusing on the suddenness 
of an event. Although air pollution is often considered a 
chronic problem, acute episodes are also possible. Con-
sider the London pollution incident of 1952. Beginning 
on December 4, 1952, winds over the Thames valley be-
gan to die down just as a temperature inversion was 
developing (Wise, 1968, p. 15-16). The next morning, as 
emissions from coal fire stations and domestic chimneys 
entered the atmosphere, the morning fog had become 
massively polluted, and by early evening that day, the 
death toll had begun (Wise, 1968, p. 16). The killer smog 
lasted only four days, but in that short time nearly one 
out of every two thousand residents of London died 
(Wise, 1968, p. 16). The severity of the 1952 smog is 
hard to fathom today. Even police cars were forced off 
the streets because of the lack of visibility (Wise, 1968, 
p. 124). An observer reported that a bride’s dress had 
been turned “nearly black,” because she and the groom 
“had been compelled to walk a considerable distance, 
from the church to the Underground station,” no taxis 
being available (Wise, 1968, p. 131).
Although this was a sudden episode, it reflected 
a chronic problem, and we would be led astray if we fo-
cused only on that episode. The “Killer Fog” of 1952 was 
the culmination of centuries of serious pollution, which 
as early as 1578 had resulted in a royal proclamation 
banning the burning of coal while Parliament was in ses-
sion (Wise, 1968, p. 19). Reformers had struggled in vain 
for action against air pollution; “the problem of Britain’s 
polluted atmosphere was no nearer a solution than it 
had been at the turn of the century” (Wise, 1968, p. 50).
Fortunately, no Brazilian city has suffered a simi-
lar pollution crisis. But the health effects of air pollution 
are still appreciable.9 According to one Brazilian study:
In relation to respiratory mortality in the elderly, it is 
estimated that over 600 deaths/year are attributable to 
the current mean PM10, corresponding to 4.9% of the 
total respiratory mortality observed in these cities.
For children under five years of age, an estimated total 
of approximately 47 deaths from respiratory causes 
are attributable to PM10 levels, representing 5.5% of 
all respiratory deaths recorded during the period.
It is also estimated that the observed PM10 levels in 
these Brazilian state capitals are responsible for 5.2% 
of hospital admissions from respiratory causes among 
children and 8.3% among the elderly, totaling 4,581 
admissions per year in the seven cities (Marcilio and 
Gouveia, 2007, p. S532).
The findings of this Brazilian study also illustrate 
the complexity of the concept of a “disaster.” If the same 
number of deaths occurred in one place in a week or 
two, that would undoubtedly be considered a disaster. 
But from the point of view of the victims, it makes no 
difference whether the same number of deaths and ill-
nesses are found in only one city or in the seven cov-
ered in the study, or whether the ill effects are spread 
over a year or concentrated in one week. Thus, we can 
be led astray in thinking that a disaster, as an acute epi-
sode, is fundamentally different than an equally harmful 
chronic condition.
Although the field of disaster law does not have 
sharp boundaries, the core cases are fairly clear. Hurri-
canes, floods, and earthquakes are clearly natural disas-
ters, despite the importance of human factors in deter-
mining the extent of harm. Humans play a more direct 
role in oil and chemical spills or nuclear accidents, but 
the difference between “natural disasters” and “human 
accidents” is not fundamental. Consequently, both will 
be discussed in this article.
Given a better understanding of the nature of di-
sasters, we next need to map the legal and policy issues 
and their interrelationships. Part B provides a roadmap 
to disaster issues.
The Cycle of Disaster Law
Presently, disasters and their applicable legal re-
gimes are addressed within broad areas of legal study 
and practice, most notably tort, contracts, administra-
tive, and constitutional law. Issues such as liability and 
risk-sharing, breach of contract (with possible defenses 
of commercial impracticability or frustration of pur-
pose), and federalism each bear upon disaster response 
and management. Disaster issues span insurance law, 
tort law, and administrative law, which are normally 
considered very different fields. This section considers 
the ways in which these disparate issues interconnect 
in the distinctive context of disasters. What most char-
9 A comprehensive study in 2011 showed that health effects are significant even when current Brazilian air pollution limits are met. See Olmo (2011, p. 681).  Air pollu-
tion problems are significant even in smaller cities. A 2006 study showed that air pollution episodes resulted in increased hospitalization for pneumonia in São José dos 
Campos. See Nascimento et al. (2006).
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acterizes the field is the “cycle of disaster law”: a set 
of strategies including “mitigation, emergency response, 
compensation, and rebuilding,” with rebuilding complet-
ing the circle by including or failing to include mitigation 
measures (Farber et al., 2010, p. 3).
Figure 1. The Cycle of Disaster Law.
Risk Mitigation. Part II and Part III of this article 
focus on mitigation. It is important to realize that the 
risk of harm from disasters is not outside of human con-
trol. With proper planning, the risk of flooding can be 
reduced, nuclear reactors and offshore oil rigs can be 
made safer, and climate change can be limited.
Disasters are often caused or exacerbated by 
failures in environmental protection. In a recent book, 
Professor Robert Verchick highlights the importance of 
what he calls natural infrastructure – that is, the role 
of nature “as a substructure in human flourishing” in 
providing essential services such as protection against 
floods, carbon sequestration, and food supplies like 
fisheries (Verchick, 2010, p. 22). As Professor Verchick 
explains, “an infrastructure perspective helps remind us 
that natural goods and services come as part of larger, 
interconnected systems” (Verchick, 2010, p. 23). Dam-
aged built-infrastructure can damage the environment; 
damaged natural infrastructure can lead to or amplify 
natural disasters. 
Emergency Response. Combined with the disaster 
event itself, this is the most dramatic phase of the di-
saster cycle. Here, the legal structure can provide clear 
lines of authority to respond to emergency conditions 
and can mandate the appropriate planning and training. 
For example, it is important to determine the role of 
the military in responding to disasters versus civilian 
authorities.
Compensation. Although most of the public’s at-
tention goes to prevention and emergency response, 
victim compensation is a central focus of disaster law. 
The legal system provides a mix of public and private 
sector methods for compensating victims of natural 
disasters. Each of the methods that have been used 
to provide compensation for catastrophic risks has its 
limitations.
The first method of compensation is private 
insurance. However, the unavailability of insurance for 
catastrophic risks (due to expense or underwriting 
risks, exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract, and 
the difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims) 
create significant hurdles. Insurance is not commonly 
considered as a way of dealing with risks in the area of 
environmental law, perhaps because the harm relates to 
health rather than property. But it may not always be 
feasible to eliminate environmental risks, and insurance 
could provide a useful backup.
The second method of compensation, litigation 
against responsible private parties, also has its limita-
tions: the need for proof of negligence or other basis 
for liability; limits on the financial assets and insurance 
coverage of potential defendants; and other judicial doc-
trines limiting recovery. But in some cases liability can 
result in extraordinary damage awards.
Third is the possibility of obtaining compensa-
tion from the government through various routes: tort 
claims against federal or state government for negli-
gence (subject to immunity defenses); claims under 
special compensation schemes for particular disasters; 
and claims based on constitutional provisions requiring 
compensation for the taking (or in some states, damag-
ing) of property. In addition, the United States govern-
ment provides flood insurance.10 The U.S. has no similar 
system of insurance for other hazards.
Instead, the United States has a makeshift assem-
bly of jerry-rigged components:
In the final analysis, the U.S. has what might well be ter-
med a patchwork system for providing financial com-
pensation for catastrophic loss. [...] Inevitably, in such 
a multifaceted milieu, where the tendency has been to 
develop discrete schemes in response to particulari-
zed categories of disasters (or rely on general welfare 
schemes that were enacted without disaster relief in 
mind), there will be ongoing fine-tuning of the system 
and a continuing dialogue over the efficacy of the me-
asures in place (Rabin and Bratis, 2006, p. 303, 356).
10 For a discussion of the system and issues about its functioning, see Michel-Kerjan (2010, p. 165).
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Rebuilding and Restoration. When buildings are 
harmed or destroyed by a disaster, they must be re-
built or space must be found for the same activities 
elsewhere. Often, rebuilding in the same place may be 
unwise and land use controls may be warranted. When 
this is not feasible, building requirements can be used to 
increase safety. Natural resources damaged by disasters 
such as oil spills may recover naturally, but they may also 
require clean-up efforts or active restoration to replace 
damaged plants and animals.
These phases of the “cycle of disaster law” are 
related to each other. In the context of disaster law, le-
gal rules interact in unique ways. For example, the avail-
ability of insurance coverage and public benefits after a 
disaster may affect pre-disaster mitigation measures—it 
follows that issues in land use, disaster response, miti-
gation, and compensation cannot be considered in iso-
lation. Individual courses on land use, torts, insurance, 
administrative law, etc., cannot adequately treat the in-
teractions between these areas of law.
Complex interactions and structures character-
ize both the “cycle of disaster law” and also its com-
ponents. Risk involves a network of interconnected 
strategies, while disaster response involves careful in-
stitutional design, and recovery involves the interplay 
between funding mechanisms (some private, some state 
or federal) and local government efforts. Other fields 
of law may touch on parts of the puzzle (state and local 
government law, insurance law, land use law, tort law) 
but miss the larger picture.
 Finally, disaster law as a whole is unified by the 
concept of risk management. Each stage of the cycle of 
disaster law—mitigation, emergency response, insur-
ance/liability compensation, government assistance, re-
building—is part of this risk management portfolio. Miti-
gation efforts attempt to lessen the potential impact of 
disaster events before the fact, while disaster response 
attempts to do so afterwards. Insurance, tort, and gov-
ernment disaster assistance provide ways of spreading 
and shifting risks. Rebuilding is in some sense just the 
mitigation phase for the next disaster down the road.
Risk management techniques for disasters are 
interwoven. For instance, the prospect of generous di-
saster assistance creates moral hazard, which in turn 
may necessitate government intervention to ensure 
adequate mitigation. In turn, adequate mitigation before 
the fact reduces the need for disaster assistance or in-
surance after the event. Disaster response can have a 
similar relationship with mitigation, but then reduces 
the need for post-disaster assistance or other forms of 
risk spreading. To complete the cycle, post-disaster as-
sistance, insurance, and other forms of compensation 
help shape post-disaster rebuilding and the degree to 
which future disaster risks are mitigated. Thus, there is 
tight linkage between various risk management strate-
gies, providing a conceptual framework for disaster law.
Part II will focus on the risk mitigation phase of 
disasters and what happens in the absence of mitigation, 
when regulatory failures create accident risks or amplify 
risks from natural disasters. This is perhaps the most 
overlooked aspect of the circle of disaster management. 
Yet, this phase may have the greatest potential for re-
ducing the human toll from disasters.
Disaster Risks and Regulatory 
Failure
People tend to think of a disaster as a physical 
phenomenon stemming from natural events or complex 
engineering projects such as a nuclear reactor. Such 
physical phenomena are a necessary component of risk, 
but they are only the starting point in addressing safety 
concerns. Whether a risk materializes and the extent 
of the resulting harm are almost always mediated by 
human actions. Those actions, in turn, take place inside 
organizations with their own histories and cultures. To 
understand risk, we need to see the human context as 
well as the physical events that cause harm. Only then 
can we begin to determine the appropriate response 
to risk. 
Disasters are dramatic events, but we need to 
look past the events themselves to learn more about 
the sources of risk and their mitigation. Doing so re-
veals that disasters are not simply accidents or Acts of 
God—they also involve the failure of the legal system to 
effectively address risks. Thus, disaster law (dealing with 
disaster preparation, response, and recovery) is closely 
linked with regulatory law (especially dealing specifically 
with land use planning and control of environmental 
risks). That link between disaster harms and regulatory 
failure is the subject of the following four case studies. 
As we will then discuss in Part III, climate change will 
vastly strengthen this linkage between environmental 
law and disaster law.
We typically think of regulatory law as address-
ing long-term problems such as air and water pollution, 
climate change, and biodiversity. In contrast, we think of 
disasters as being sudden events, although as discussed 
earlier this is a contestable idea. But the two are inti-
mately related: disasters are often the result of long-
term failure of regulations, while pollution incidents like 
the 1952 London Killer Fog can be sudden and dev-
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astating. The connections between chronic regulatory 
failures are explored below in the context of nuclear 
accidents, oil spills, heat waves, and floods. As discussed 
earlier, although some of these events are often called 
natural disasters and others are called accidents, the 
fundamental policy issues are similar.
Nuclear Accidents
The story begins with a catastrophic natural 
event. At 2:46 pm Japan standard time on March 11, 
2011 (9:46pm PST on March 10), a 9.0 earthquake 
struck off the east coast of Honshu, Japan, 109 miles 
ENE of Fukushima and 231 miles NE of Tokyo (USGS, 
2011). The earthquake also triggered a large tsunami 
that overwhelmed seawalls and contributed to massive 
destruction (Onishi, 2011). The tsunami waves spanned 
a great height; the maximum height was 127 feet at 
Aneyoshi, Miyako (International Atomic Energy Agency, 
2011). As of July 14, more than fifteen thousand people 
were known to be dead; over five thousand people were 
still missing. More than 227,000 buildings have totally 
or partially collapsed; and 3,559 roads, 77 bridges, and 
29 railways have been damaged (National Police Agency 
of Japan, 2011). As of June 30, 116,213 people had been 
evacuated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011). 
Economic losses from the earthquake are estimated at 
$210 billion, making it the costliest natural disaster on 
record; the overall economic loss for Hurricane Katrina 
was $125 billion (Munich Re, 2011).
The earthquake itself was outside of human con-
trol, but the regulatory dimension of the disaster involves 
nuclear power, which turned out to be inadequately 
regulated for the emergency. During the earthquake, the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi lost outside power—connection to 
the electrical grid. Backup diesel generators came on at 
this time. The Dai-ni plant did not lose power, but did 
face degraded safety systems (International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, 2011). About 46 minutes after the quake, the 
first waves of a large tsunami reached the Fukushima Dai-
ichi power station. The tsunami reached about 14 meters 
(45 feet) at the Dai-ichi power station, overwhelming the 
6-meter (18-foot) seawall. The IAEA report provides a 
vivid sense of the post-tsunami state at the nuclear plant: 
The tsunami and associated large debris caused wi-
despread destruction of many buildings, doors, roads, 
tanks and other site infrastructure at Fukushima Dai-
ichi, including loss of heat sinks. The operators were 
faced with a catastrophic, unprecedented emergency 
scenario with no power, reactor control or instru-
mentation, and in addition, severely affected commu-
nications systems both within and external to the site. 
They had to work in darkness with almost no instru-
mentation and control systems to secure the safety 
of six reactors, six nuclear fuel pools, a common fuel 
pool and dry cask storage facilities (International Ato-
mic Energy Agency, 2011, p. 11-12).
Explosions occurred at units 1-4; the explosions 
at units 1-3 were caused by a build-up of hydrogen and 
the cause for the explosion at unit 4 remains unknown. 
Diesel generators at unit 6 remained functional in the 
aftermath of the tsunami and workers were able to use 
it to achieve a cold shutdown11 at units 5 and 6. Units 
1-3 have still not yet achieved cold shutdown. Nuclear 
Emergency Situations have been declared for both the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni power stations 
resulting in evacuations and emergency measures.12 
As the 2011 tsunami and its aftermath illustrate, 
the interdependency of modern societies makes them 
especially prone to disruption by disasters, as damage 
to basic networks interferes with the delivery of key 
services. But overly optimistic regulators, who failed to 
take into account the need for more rigorous regulation 
of nuclear plants, may have contributed to the disaster.
It is important to keep in mind the possibility of 
catastrophic events when designing and siting potentially 
dangerous facilities such as nuclear reactors. Long time 
periods between such events may give a false sense of 
security. It might seem ridiculous to worry about an 
event that only occurs once every thousand years. But 
this means that there is one chance in a thousand that the 
event will happen in any given year. If a facility will be in 
operation for fifty years, which is not impossible for many 
nuclear reactors, then there is a 5% chance (50 x 1/1000) 
that the event will strike during the lifetime of the facility. 
If the consequences would be sufficiently severe, that is 
a possibility worth considering when planning the facility.
Oil and Chemical Spills 
The largest recent oil spill was the Deepwater 
Horizon BP oil spill of 2010. On April 20, 2010, while 
drilling at the Macondo Prospect about 83 kilometers 
11 Cold shutdown is achieved after several days once the reactor is no longer critical (temperatures below 200° F)—even after the cooling rods are inserted and fission 
stops, the radioactive products continue to generate significant heat.
12 See the May 17th update of the TEPCO Roadmap towards Restoration here: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110517e3.pdf
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southeast of Louisiana, an explosion on the Deepwater 
Horizon caused by a blowout killed 11 of 126 crewmen 
(Associated Press, 2010b). Two days later, despite efforts 
to put out the blaze on the oil rig, the Deepwater Ho-
rizon sank in 1500 meters of water.13 Throughout the 
end of April, May, and June, estimates of the flow of oil 
increased from 1,000 barrels of crude per day (bpd), to 
5000 bpd, to as many as 60,000 bpd (Gillis, 2010). On 
July 15, BP finally stopped the flow of oil for the first 
time in nearly three months (Gillis, 2010). And about 
three weeks later, on August 4, BP executed a successful 
‘static kill,’ and a cement plug introduced on September 
19 left the well effectively dead and the crisis officially 
over (Gillis, 2010). Environmental and economy recov-
ery, however, will take much longer. It is unclear to what 
extent oil will continue to wash up on the Gulf coast, 
whether species such as the dwarf seahorse can over-
come the loss of so much of their habitat, and whether 
dispersants used during cleanup efforts may have un-
foreseen consequences on the environment.14 
In terms of the “root causes” of the blowout, 
the Presidential Commission investigating the accident 
identified management failures by industry and a dys-
functional regulatory system (National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, 2010, p. 122-127). The accident “resulted from clear 
mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton, 
and Transocean, and by government officials who, relying 
too much on industry’s assertions of the safety of their 
operations, failed to create and apply a program of regu-
latory oversight that would have properly minimized 
the risks of deepwater drilling” (National Commission 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, 2010, p. 127). Thus, the oil spill fundamentally 
stemmed from a failure of environmental regulation as 
well as negligence by private firms. 
Brazil also suffered a major recent oil spill. On 
November 7, 2011, a pressure spike occurred during the 
drilling of an exploratory well at a depth of 1000 meters 
about 120 kilometers offshore. According to Chevron, 
although the well was immediately sealed, leakage began 
from the seabed nearby and continued for four days.15 
Chevron was fined 50 million reals, and it was reported 
that authorities were considering indictments against 
employees who were involved in the leak (Carroll and 
Spinetto, 2011). In addition, a federal prosecutor filed a 
lawsuit for $11 billion in damages against Chevron al-
leging that “Chevron and Transocean were not capable 
of controlling the damages caused by the leakage” and 
that there was “evidence of a lack of planning and envi-
ronmental management by the companies.”16 Concerns 
have also been expressed about the risk assessments 
used for drilling operations offshore of Brazil.17
As was also true of the Fukushima accident, oil 
spills may be in some sense accidental, but they may also 
reflect organizational and regulatory failures. Harm to 
the environment stemming from these accidents is not 
simply a random event but a reflection of failures by 
society to mitigate the risks appropriately.
Heat Waves
A heat wave may seem like the least manmade of 
events. The summer of 2003 was the hottest in Europe 
for at least five hundred years (Larsen, 2006). An anti-
cyclone (high pressure area) sat over Western Europe, 
preventing cooler air from the Atlantic from entering 
(UNEP, 2003). Temperatures reached extraordinary 
heights. The summer weather in Geneva was similar 
to the normal summer in Rio de Janeiro (UNEP, 2003). 
Temperatures in parts of Italy in August were over eight 
degrees centigrade warmer than the preceding year; 
in Portugal, temperatures were over forty degrees for 
many days, while London had its first recorded tempera-
tures over thirty-eight degrees in history (Larsen, 2006).
The prolonged heat was catastrophic. Estimates 
of the total number of deaths begin at thirty thousand 
and run as high as fifty thousand (Larsen, 2006). In Paris 
alone, there were over twelve hundred deaths (Cadot et 
al., 2007, p. 466-468). The estimate for France as a whole 
was over fourteen thousand (Cadot et al., 2007, p. 466-
468). The biggest risk factors were “being a woman 75 
13 The Guardian (2010). For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the spill, see National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling (2010, p. 89-122).
14 Gillis (2010). The difficulties encountered in closing the well are discussed in National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 
(2010, p. 129-170). 
15 Chevron, Frade Response-Background, http://chevron.com/fraderesponse/background.
16 Reuters (2011). For a discussion of the contrasting roles of environmental criminal law in the United States and Brazil, see Blomquist (2011, p. 83, 88-92) and McAllis-
ter (2008, p. 4).
17 Vidal (2010). “The platform is now operating 125km off the coast of Brazil in 1,798 metres (5,900 feet) of water—deeper than BP’s Deepwater rig that exploded 
in April and led to the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. [T]he 14-page environment report prepared by the [bank financing the drilling operations] makes no 
mention of blowouts or the equipment needed to prevent them. Ministers have edited out all ECDG’s comments assessing the risks involved in deep-sea drilling in 
the Atlantic.”
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years old and older and living alone at home” (Cadot et 
al., 2007, p. 466-468). In addition to its health impacts, 
the heat wave also impacted agriculture and caused nu-
merous forest fires, destroying over 640,000 hectares of 
forest (roughly 2500 square miles, an area about the size 
of Delaware) (UNEP, 2003).
The heat wave was extreme compared to histor-
ical temperatures, but less abnormal compared to re-
cent decades because of the long-term increase of very 
hot days in Europe (Rebetez et al., 2006, p. 569-577). 
Although it is impossible to say whether climate change 
“caused” this particular heat wave, it is possible to ask 
whether climate change increased the likelihood of such 
a heat wave. Scientists have concluded that “past human 
influence has more than doubled the risk of European 
mean summer temperatures as hot as 2003” and that 
“the likelihood of such events [is] projected to increase 
100-fold over the next four decades.”18
Flooding
Flooding is a familiar risk, but the dangers may 
be underestimated because of this familiarity. Hurri-
cane Katrina illustrates the seriousness of flood risks 
and the way that failures of risk management turned a 
relatively routine event into a catastrophe. The impacts 
were severe: “killing more than 1,500, leaving hundreds 
of thousands homeless, and ravaging one of America’s 
most storied cities,” not to mention billions of dollars 
in property damage (United States Senate Committee 
On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs, 2006, 
1-1 to 1-14, 2-1 to 2-2). Property damage estimates ap-
proach $100 billion (United States Senate Committee 
On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs, 2006, 
1-1). The New Orleans flood represented the tech-
nological failure of inadequate flood control measures 
against a predictable, risky and potentially lethal event.19
After floods in 1927, the U.S. built levees along 
the Mississippi that have prevented silt from reaching 
Louisiana wetlands (McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006, 
p. 70-86). Since the construction of these levees, wet-
lands have been starved of sediment, causing them to 
“become waterlogged, sink and die” (McQuaid and 
Schleifstein, 2006, p. 70-86). The silt ends up uselessly 
collecting at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Thus, 
efforts to reduce flooding in the Mississippi River basin 
have increased the risk of flooding along the coast of 
the Gulf of Mexico.
After Hurricane Katrina, it became apparent 
that the disappearance of the wetlands increased di-
saster risks to the region. Wetlands absorb the impact 
of storms, slowing them down once they make landfall 
(Sullivan, 2005). For every 12 kilometers of wetlands, 
storm surges are reduced one meter (Sullivan, 2005). 
However, New Orleans is now increasingly exposed to 
violent storms because so many of the wetlands have 
collapsed, in part due to the levee system that surrounds 
the city (Sullivan, 2005). In addition, barrier islands pro-
vide protection for “half a million people from violent 
storms, along with an international commercial-indus-
trial complex worth billions” (Verchick, 2010, p. 34). Yet 
these barrier islands are rapidly disappearing (Verchick, 
2010, p. 34-35).
Although whether climate change contributed 
to Hurricane Katrina is unclear, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change considers it likely that climate 
change will lead to future Katrinas. According to the 
IPCC, “it is likely that future tropical cyclones (typhoons 
and hurricanes) will become more intense, with larger 
peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation asso-
ciated with ongoing increases of tropical SSTs” (IPCC, 
2007, p. 15). We know with somewhat more confidence 
that climate change will destroy the wetlands that buffer 
storm surges. Sea level rise is one of the most predict-
able consequences of climate change.20 Apart from the 
unknown contribution from melting ice sheets in Green-
land and Antarctica,21 the simple change in temperature 
of the oceans will contribute to thermal expansion, just 
as increased temperature causes the mercury in a ther-
mometer to rise.22 This rise in sea level will result in loss 
of coastal lands,23 increased exposure to flood damage, 
not to mention such other harms as salt water intrusion 
into estuaries and drinking water supplies.24
The Katrina disaster illustrates the close rela-
tionship between disaster law and land use planning. 
A key method of mitigating disaster risks is to avoid 
18 Stott et al. (2004, p. 610). Fortunately, nothing of this severity has struck Brazil, although one heat wave in 2010 killed over thirty people. See Associated Press (2010a).
19 For an overview of the failures in planning the levee system, see McQuaid and Schleifstein (2006, p. 70-86).
20 See, e.g., Hasselman et al. (2003, p. 1923, Figure 2) (predicting a two meter increase in sea level under a “business as usual” scenario by 2100; but only 20 centimeters 
under an optimum regulatory strategy).
21 On the potential for catastrophic melting in these areas, see Stern (2007, p. 16) and IPCC (2007, p. 16).
22 Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks. See Portner and Knust (2007, p. 95). 
23 Pittock (2005) gives examples, including China (p. 264), India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (p. 268), and the United States (p. 278).
24 See Kolbert (2006, p. 123-124) (British governmental study indicating that what are now hundred-year floods could become routine by late in this century). See also 
Pittock (2005, p. 118) (stating that without adaptive measures, annual flood losses would increase from – 1-24 billion in different scenarios).
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putting people and key facilities in harm’s way. More-
over, land use controls can help maintain key buffers like 
coastal wetlands as a form of natural infrastructure. 
Brazil has not suffered a storm of the scale of Ka-
trina, but storms and flooding remain serious problems:
Torrential rains inundated a heavily populated, steep-
sloped area about 40 miles north of Rio de Janeiro 
on Tuesday and Wednesday, triggering flash floods and 
mudslides that have claimed at least 511 lives. Rainfall 
amounts of approximately 300 mm (12 inches) fell in 
just a few hours in the hardest-hit regions, Teresopolis 
and Nova Friburgo. Many more people are missing, and 
the death toll is expected to go much higher once 
rescuers reach remote villages that have been cut off 
from communications. The death toll makes the Janu-
ary 2011 floods Brazil’s worst single-day natural di-
saster in its history. Brazil suffers hundreds of deaths 
each year due to flooding and mudslides, but the past 
12 months have been particularly devastating. Flooding 
and landslides near Rio in April last year killed 246 pe-
ople and did about $13 billion in damage, and at least 
85 people perished last January during a similar event 
(Romm, 2011).
As noted earlier, these losses are not simply un-
avoidable acts of nature; they also reflect lack of prepara-
tion. As one Brazilian expert explained, “The important 
thing is to plan [...] Zoning and urban planning are needed, 
and must take climatic aspects into account” (Frayssinet, 
2009). Moreover, the victims are likely to be the poor, 
who cannot afford to live in safer areas (Frayssinet, 2009).
Hurricane Katrina also illustrates the link be-
tween disasters and inequality. Equality issues were im-
possible to miss during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. 
Consider the New Orleans Superdome, which offered 
shelter of last resort: “The Dome was a brewing pub-
lic health disaster. [T]he number of people inside had 
doubled in twenty-four hours, becoming a virtual city 
of twenty-thousand, overwhelmingly poor and African 
American” (McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006, p. 235). For 
days, it was “clear to anyone watching television that the 
majority of people trapped in New Orleans were Afri-
can Americans, most from the low end of the income 
spectrum” (McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006, p. 300). For 
“much of New Orleans’ white population had departed 
before the storm hit, while the remainder lived in ar-
eas closer to dry land and found it easier to escape” 
(McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006, p. 300). Ultimately, the 
Congressional Research Service found that “an estimat-
ed 272,000 black people were displaced by flooding or 
damage, accounting for 73% of the population affected 
by the storm in the parish” (Gabe, 2005, p. 14, 16-17).
The connection of race and poverty with evacu-
ation rates was not unique to Katrina. As the National 
Research Council found:
[R]esearch has shown that different racial, ethnic, in-
come, and special needs groups respond in different 
ways to warning information and evacuation orders. 
[...] Lower-income groups, inner-city residents, and el-
derly persons are more likely to have to rely on public 
transportation, rather than personal vehicles, in order 
to evacuate (Committee on Disaster Research in the 
Social Sciences, National Research Council, Future 
Challenges and Opportunities, 2006, p. 129).
Both globally and within the United States, “so-
cial injustice contributes so heavily to the incidence and 
intensity of natural disasters that the quest for equality 
may be regarded as a valuable tool for improving disas-
ter preparedness, response, mitigation, compensation, 
and rebuilding” (Farber et al., 2010, p. 204).
In all four of these disaster examples—nuclear 
risks, oil spills, heat waves, and flooding—we see a close 
relationship between a sudden catastrophic event and 
a long-term environmental problem or regulatory fail-
ure. Good environmental law decreases the likelihood 
and severity of natural disasters. Failure to protect the 
environment has the converse effect. The greatest envi-
ronmental problem of our time is climate change. Part 
III shows how climate change will bring environmental 
issues and even disaster law closer together.
Climate Change: Planning for  
A Slow-Moving Disaster
Environmental law and disaster law encounter 
each other most fully in the arena of climate change. Cli-
mate change happens over a period of many years, but 
the effects may be as severe as any natural disaster. Cli-
mate change is already underway. With rare exceptions, 
recent years rank at the top of the list of the warm-
est global temperatures (Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, 
p. 43), and depending on future emissions and climate 
sensitivity, the world will end up 2–7 ˚C warmer than it 
is today (Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, p. 129). Tempera-
ture change in the arctic will be about twice as large 
(Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, p. 133). Even warming of 
2 ˚C, which may be the best we can hope for, would 
leave the earth warmer than it has been in millions of 
years (Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, p. 225).
Other changes are also foreseeable around the 
world. Snow cover will decrease in most areas (Archer 
and Rahmstorf, 2010, p. 147), and oceans will become 
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increasingly acidic (Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, p. 148). 
Even moderate climate change will trigger significant 
extinctions (Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, p. 162), and 
extreme events such as fires, floods, and heat waves will 
become more widespread.25 Adaptation to these im-
pending changes poses serious challenges.26 “Extreme 
events such as floods and drought cause extensive dam-
age to many parts of society, and thus a critical issue for 
adaptation is the degree to which frequency, intensity, 
and persistence of extreme events change” (Easterling 
III et al., 2004, p. 17).
The effects of climate change have been mod-
eled in detail for the United States. The U.S. will expe-
rience significant temperature changes.27 Temperatures 
are expected to rise everywhere, but more inland than 
in coastal or southern areas in the continental United 
States, with the greatest increases in Northern Alaska 
(U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2010, p. 29). 
In the Southeast United States, even though absolute 
changes will be smaller, the baseline is high, resulting 
in many more very hot days later in this century (U.S. 
Global Change Research Program, 2010, p. 112). In the 
Midwest, urban life will be burdened by increasing heat 
waves and decreased air quality (U.S. Global Change Re-
search Program, 2010, p. 117).
 Sea level rise due to climate change may cause 
dramatic losses in wetlands in the United States (Laz-
aroff, 2002). Two-thirds of all U.S. coastal wetlands 
would be lost with a one-meter rise in sea level (Laz-
aroff, 2002, p. 84). This loss would be in addition to 
extensive past losses of wetlands in Louisiana (Laz-
aroff, 2002, p. 84), and continued loss of lands. The sa-
linity of remaining wetlands, estuaries and tidal rivers 
would also change (Lazaroff, 2002, p. 114). Hurricanes, 
which may increase in intensity, result in further loss 
of coastal lands; Hurricane Katrina, for example, elimi-
nated over two hundred square miles (roughly 500 
km2) of wetlands (Lazaroff, 2002, p. 115). What used to 
be a one hundred-year flood in New York City is now 
an eighty-year flood, and may be a twenty-year flood 
by mid-century (Cullen, 2010, p. 238). Correspondingly, 
even more severe floods will become more frequent. 
Changes stemming from sea level rise will not neces-
sarily be gradual. There could be sudden loss of protec-
tive lands that buffer storm surges or in abrupt intru-
sions of salt water into aquifers (U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, 2010, p. 115).
Sea level rise will also cause other harms in the 
United States. Because the slope of coastal areas on the 
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is low, a forty-centimeter rise 
in sea level could result in as much as sixty meters of 
beach erosion and may cost billions of dollars (Gross-
man, 2003, p. 12-14). Finally, as noted earlier, sea level 
rise can result in widespread salt intrusion into aqui-
fers, as well as severe beach erosion, wetlands loss, and 
flooding (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2010, 
p. 114).
Although the predictions are subject to uncer-
tainty, climate change also appears to be a serious issue 
for Brazil:
Brazil is vulnerable to climate change, not least due to 
its fragile, biologically diverse ecosystems. The tropical 
rain forest in the Amazon and the Pantanal wetland 
are of particular concern. [...] There is also concern 
that coral reefs along Brazilian coastlines could suffer 
from the effects of climate change.
Changing rainfall patterns, especially in the drought-
affected northeastern region of the country, will mean 
poorer water resources and a reduced water supply. 
[...] Floods, which are already a serious problem for 
various regions, may increase. Coastal areas, where 
the bulk of the population and economic activities are 
concentrated, will be vulnerable to rising sea levels (La 
Rovere and Pereira, 2007).
According to a report commissioned by the Eu-
ropean Commission:
After the long period of drought in 2005, omputeri-
zed forecasting systems detected that the integrity of 
the Amazon rainforests could be affected by the pro-
cesses of savannah expansion. Over the past decades, 
increases in temperature and erratic rainfall have led 
to a massive reversal in carbon absorption. Trees are 
dying out more rapidly where the droughts have been 
most intense (AGRIFOR Consult, 2009, p. 14).
A recent report by the Hadley Centre in Britain 
reports that sea level rise could have a major impact 
on Brazil:
One study places Brazil within the top 15 countries 
simulated to show an increased exposure from SLR 
[sea level rise] relative to present in the 2070s, based 
upon a global assessment of 136 port cities. A 10% in-
tensification of the current 1-in-100-year storm surge 
25 These challenges are discussed in Bonyhady et al. (2010); U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010).
26 For an overview of the failures in planning the levee system, see McQuaid and Schleifstein (2006, p. 70-86).
27 The most recent information about U.S. climate impacts can be found in U.S. Global Change Research Program (2010) (hereinafter U.S. Impacts).
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combined with a 1m SLR could affect around 15% of 
Brazil’s coastal land area and 30% of the coastal popu-
lation (Met Office Hadley Center, 2011, p. 121).
Given these risks, it is not too soon for major 
countries such as the United States and Brazil to begin 
planning to deal with the effects of climate change. The 
U.S. government is just beginning to seriously address 
adaptation issues, following most of a decade in which 
climate change issues of all kinds were ignored or down-
played. President Obama appointed a task force com-
posed of key federal agencies to investigate adaptation. 
The Task Force’s Report is a solid step forward in prepar-
ing the US to deal with the challenges of climate change 
(The White House Council On Environmental Quality, 
2010). There are three key recommendations relating to 
domestic adaptation measures at the federal level.
First, according to the Report, adaptation needs 
to become a standard part of agency planning (The 
White House Council On Environmental Quality, 2010, 
p. 10, 25-26). The plans should focus on ecosystems 
rather than either individual species or governmental ju-
risdictions (The White House Council On Environmen-
tal Quality, 2010, p. 22).  An important recommendation 
is that adaptation plans should prioritize the most vul-
nerable people, places, and infrastructure (The White 
House Council On Environmental Quality, 2010, p. 11):
Adaptation plans should prioritize helping people, pla-
ces, and infrastructure that are most vulnerable to cli-
mate impacts. They should also be designed and imple-
mented with meaningful involvement from all parts of 
society. Issues of inequality and environmental justice 
associated with climate change impacts and adaptation 
should be addressed (The White House Council On 
Environmental Quality, 2010, p. 21).
This recommendation has obvious relevance for disas-
ter planning as well.
Second, the government needs to ensure that sci-
entific information about the impacts of climate change 
is easily accessible (The White House Council On En-
vironmental Quality, 2010, p. 30-33). Without solid sci-
entific information, public and private sector decision-
makers cannot plan intelligently. This effort would build 
on the US Geologic Survey and its National Climate As-
sessment (The White House Council On Environmental 
Quality, 2010, p. 23, 49). There is a similar need for public 
information regarding disaster risks.
Third, the government needs to address climate 
impacts that cut across agency jurisdictions and missions 
(The White House Council On Environmental Quality, 
2010, p. 34). Unfortunately, this is the case for many of 
the main impacts, such as those that threaten water re-
sources (The White House Council On Environmental 
Quality, 2010, p. 35-36), public health (The White House 
Council On Environmental Quality, 2010, p. 37-38), 
oceans and coasts (The White House Council On Envi-
ronmental Quality, 2010, p. 42-43), and communities (The 
White House Council On Environmental Quality, 2010, 
p. 39-40). Some important arenas for agency action are to 
improve water-use efficiency (The White House Council 
On Environmental Quality, 2010, p. 36), strengthen pub-
lic health systems (The White House Council On Envi-
ronmental Quality, 2010, p. 38), integrate climate risks 
into insurance (The White House Council On Environ-
mental Quality, 2010, p. 41), and develop an open-source 
risk assessment model (The White House Council On 
Environmental Quality, 2010, p. 21).
Some of these recommendations are relevant 
only for the United States, but others provide useful 
guidance in other countries such as Brazil. Disaster 
planning is increasingly connected with adaptation plan-
ning. In the coming era, disasters will result from inter-
linked changes in physical and ecological systems due to 
climate change. Thus, disaster planning will need to be 
part of a broader effort that takes into account climate 
change, natural capital, and societal resilience.
The events discussed in this article—nuclear ac-
cidents, floods, oil spills, heat waves, and severe air pol-
lution—can all be classified as environmental disasters. 
We can consider an environmental disaster to be one 
that destroys important environmental amenities or 
one in which harm to human interests is mediated by 
an environmental change. The BP oil spill easily fits both 
criteria: it was harmful to natural ecological systems, and 
the harm was mediated by water pollution. The 2003 
European heat wave also damaged natural systems, and 
it was at least made much more likely by human changes 
in the Earth’s atmosphere. The tsunami was not caused 
by human activities, but the ensuing nuclear reactor fail-
ures were as much a failure of effective regulation as 
they were the effect of the tsunami itself.
In the era of climate change, environmental law 
will no longer be able to marginalize disaster law as a dis-
tant cousin. Disasters, both natural and human-induced, 
are an increasingly common feature of 21st century life; 
appropriate legal guidance can ensure that disasters are 
anticipated and contained in a comprehensive and equi-
table manner. Disaster law is a complex, multi-faceted, 
and rapidly expanding body of thought, one that ad-
dresses the dire need for a systematic, thoughtful ap-
proach to managing the chaos of disasters. 
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Over time, scholars hopefully will further refine 
and explore the wide variety of avenues for research 
within the field, and will continue to influence disaster 
prevention, response and management policy for the 
better. Disasters are a global problem, and the solutions 
must be equally transnational. 
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